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Introduction: Contact tracing has the potential to control outbreaks 
without the need for stringent physical distancing policies, e.g. civil 
lockdowns. Unlike forward contact tracing, backward contact tracing 
identifies the source of newly detected cases. This approach is 
particularly valuable when there is high individual-level variation in 
the number of secondary transmissions (overdispersion). 
Methods: By using a simple branching process model, we explored 
the potential of combining backward contact tracing with more 
conventional forward contact tracing for control of COVID-19. We 
estimated the typical size of clusters that can be reached by backward 
tracing and simulated the incremental effectiveness of combining 
backward tracing with conventional forward tracing. 
Results: Across ranges of parameter values consistent with dynamics 
of SARS-CoV-2, backward tracing is expected to identify a primary case 
generating 3-10 times more infections than a randomly chosen case, 
typically increasing the proportion of subsequent cases averted by a 
factor of 2-3. The estimated number of cases averted by backward 
tracing became greater with a higher degree of overdispersion. 
Conclusion: Backward contact tracing can be an effective tool for 
outbreak control, especially in the presence of overdispersion as is 
observed with SARS-CoV-2.
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Introduction
Isolation of symptomatic cases and tracing and quarantine of 
their contacts is a staple public health control measure, and has 
the potential to prevent the need for stringent physical distanc-
ing policies that result in detrimental impacts on the society 
(e.g., civil lockdowns)1,2. Contact tracing is typically triggered 
by a confirmed index case identified via symptom-based sur-
veillance. Contacts of this index case are identified via inter-
views by public health officials (manual contact tracing) or 
by tracking proximity records on digital devices (digital con-
tact tracing), and asked to quarantine in order to prevent further 
transmissions.
Contact tracing often targets ‘downstream’ individuals, who 
may have been infected by the index case (‘forward tracing’); 
i.e. those who have been in contact with the index case after the 
index case likely became infectious (often assumed as 2 days 
before illness onset for COVID-193,4). However, ‘backward trac-
ing’ can also be used to identify the upstream primary case who 
infected the index case (or a setting or event at which the index 
case was infected) by retracing history of contact to the likely 
point of exposure up to the upper bound of the incubation period. 
For example, contact history of 14 days prior to symptom onset 
is collected in Japan, where backward tracing has been operated 
from the early phase of the COVID-19 outbreak5,6. If this pri-
mary case is identified, a larger fraction of the transmission chain 
can be detected by forward tracing each of the contacts of this 
primary case.
Unlike forward tracing, backward tracing is more effective when 
the number of onward transmissions is highly variable, because 
index cases are disproportionately more likely to have been gen-
erated by primary cases who also infected others (an example of 
the “friendship paradox”7–9). Because there is evidence that the 
number of secondary transmissions of SARS-CoV-2 per case 
exhibits substantial individual-level variation (i.e. overdisper-
sion), often resulting in so-called superspreading events10–12, 
a large proportion of infections may be linked to a small pro-
portion of original clusters. As a result, finding and target-
ing originating clusters in combination with reducing onwards 
infection may substantially enhance the effectiveness of tracing 
methods9,13,14.
In the present study, using a simple branching process model, 
we explore the incremental effectiveness of combining ‘back-
ward’ tracing with conventional ‘forward’ tracing in the 
presence of overdispersion in SARS-CoV-2 transmission.
Methods
Overdispersion and the coverage of contact tracing
We used a branching process model to compare the perform-
ance of forward and backward contact tracing triggered by an 
index case found by symptom-based surveillance (Figure 1). 
We enumerate generations of transmission chains linked to the 
Figure 1. Schematic illustration of forward and backward contact tracing.  Two cases (index cases #1 and #2) from a transmission 
tree originating from an (initially) undetected primary case are assumed to be detected by surveillance. Possible results of contact tracing 
are shown where (A) only forward tracing is performed or (B) both forward and backward tracing are performed. Some cases may remain 
undetected because contact tracing can miss cases.
     Amendments from Version 1
We have made the following minor changes to the manuscript.
- Some new references in Discussion on adherence to contact 
tracing and quarantine. 
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index case so that the index case belongs to generation-1 (G1). 
Backward tracing first identifies the primary case (G0) that 
infected the index case and then applies forward tracing to those 
infected by the primary case (G1). We represent the transmission 
chains of COVID-19 by a branching process where p(x) denotes 
the offspring distribution, i.e. the probability mass function of the 
number of secondary transmissions caused by a single case. If 
an individual is identified as a primary case, they are more likely 
to have generated more cases than any random case because the 
probability that a primary case is identified is proportional to 
the number of cases it generates. Therefore, the number of off-
spring of the identified primary case follows 0
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𝔼(x) = R is the reproduction number and v is the coefficient of 
variation (the standard deviation of x divided by its mean). With 
a high overdispersion (large v), backward tracing of the index 
case can substantially increase the number of G1 cases to trace. 
Conversely, the mean number of cases that can be identified 
by forward tracing is R regardless of the degree of overdispersion.
When we assume p(x) follows a negative-binomial distribution11,15 
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cases. Existing studies suggest k for SARS-CoV-2 transmission is 
small and likely to lie within the range of 0.1–0.511,16,17. A small 
k indicates that the primary case identified through backward 
tracing typically generates more secondary cases than does a 
randomly selected case (i.e. 𝔼(x|G
0
) > E(x) = R).
The higher probability of identifying a large cluster by backward 
tracing can also be demonstrated by looking at the tail probabil-
ity of the offspring distribution. Given a negative-binomial off-
spring distribution 
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For different combinations of the reproduction number R and 
overdispersion parameter k, we estimated the mean size of an 
identified cluster in backward tracing and the probability of 
observing a size of at least 5, 10 and 25.
Simulation of the effectiveness of forward and 
backward contact tracing
Using our simple branching process model with a 
negative-binomial offspring distribution, we assessed the 
potential effectiveness of forward and backward contact trac-
ing. We assumed that contact tracing is triggered by the detec-
tion of an index case whose primary case is initially unknown so 
that our simulation would guide decision making at the opera-
tional level (i.e. whether it is worthwhile to implement contact 
tracing when a case is found). We compared two scenarios: 
forward tracing only and the combination of forward and 
backward tracing (Figure 1). In the forward only scenario, 
generation-2 (G2) cases resulting from an index case are poten-
tially traced and quarantined; in the combined scenario, more G1 
cases can be identified through backward tracing of the primary 
infection and thus a larger number of G2 cases can be traced 
and quarantined. As the infectious period of G1 cases is likely to 
have already passed when they are identified by contact trac-
ing because tracing only starts after the index case is con-
firmed, we assumed that secondary transmissions caused by 
G1 cases would not be prevented and that only G2 cases suc-
cessfully traced could be put in quarantine (which confers a 
relative reduction c in transmission). To account for potential 
limitations in the effectiveness of contact tracing, we assumed 
that the primary case is identified with probability b and that 
each offspring of identified cases are traced with probability 
q. G1 cases not traced may be independently found by symp-
tom-based surveillance; we accounted for such independ-
ent case finding with a detection probability d (although we 
excluded backward tracing triggered by these cases from analy-
sis), which is expected to be low due to frequent subclinical 
infections18. All parameters used for simulation are listed in 
Table 1.
We estimated the expected number of generation-3 (G3) cases 
averted and defined the effectiveness of contact tracing by 
the relative reduction in the total number of G3 cases. Assum-
ing a negative-binomial branching process with a mean R 
and overdispersion parameter k, the mean total number of 
G3 cases given an index case found by surveillance is
2 2
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the initially found index case is 
0
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which proportion d is independently detected by symptom-based 
surveillance. Therefore, the total number of G1 cases targeted 








Of the secondary cases generated by these G1 cases 
(R cases each on average), proportion q are successfully traced, 
i.e. Rq(1+Rd(1+1/k)) G2 cases are traced and asked to quar-
antine on average. The effective reproduction number of 
quarantined G2 cases is assumed to be R(1-c); therefore, the 
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In the combined (forward + backward) scenario, G1 cases can 








G1 cases potentially under the scope of backward tracing, a pro-
portion (1 – d)(1 – bq) will remain undetected either by back-
ward tracing or independent detection. As a result, (1-(1-d)(1-bq)) 
R(1+1/k) G1 cases are identified on average in addition to the 
index case, leading to tracing of Rq(1+(1-(1-d)(1-bq))R(1+1/k)) 
G2 cases. By asking these traced G2 cases to quarantine, G3 




1 (1 (1 )(1 )) 1 .R qc d bq R
k+
∆ = + − − − +
  
    
The effectiveness of contact tracing in the forward and com-
bined scenarios are obtained as F
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The simulation was implemented in R-3.6.1. The replication 
code and Extended data are reposited on GitHub (https://github.
com/akira-endo/COVID19_backwardtracing) and archived with 
Zenodo19.
An earlier version of this article can be found on medRxiv 
(DOI: https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.08.01.20166595).
Results
Larger clusters are likely to be detected through 
backward tracing in the presence of overdispersion
The estimated mean and the tail probabilities of the secondary 
transmissions caused by a primary case identified via backward 
contact tracing suggests the potential strength of this tracing 
approach (Table 2). With a substantial individual-level variation 
in the number of secondary transmissions per case, characterised 
by a small overdispersion parameter k of a negative-binomial 
distribution ranging between 0.1–0.5, backward tracing typi-
cally leads to a primary case generating 3–10 times more infec-
tions than a randomly chosen case (whose mean defines the 
reproduction number R). The tail probabilities, ranging from 25% 
to 88% for 5 or more offspring (Table 2), suggest that 
backward tracing is likely to find a relatively large cluster (≥5) 
under the plausible parameter settings. These values are strik-
ing because the probability of finding such clusters in for-
ward tracing will be much lower. In a case of R = 1.2 and k 
= 0.2, only 6% of random cases results in 5 or more secondary 
infections, as opposed to 53% of primary cases identified by 
backward tracing.
Backward tracing typically results in multiple-fold 
increases in the overall effectiveness of contact tracing
Using a branching process model, we simulated the effective-
ness of contact tracing. Across plausible ranges of parameter 
values, we found that introducing backward tracing in addition 
to forward tracing increased the effectiveness of contact trac-
ing by a factor of 2–3 (Figure 2 and Extended data, S1 and 
S219). Although the relative improvement in effectiveness by 
introducing backward tracing is similar between different values 
of k (0.2 and 0.5), the coverage of backward tracing scales up 
with overdispersion. We found that a higher degree of overd-
ispersion (i.e. small k) resulted in a larger absolute number of 
cases averted by backward tracing (Figure 3 and Extended data, 
S3). In the presence of substantial overdispersion (k = 0.1), 
backward tracing is expected to avert 2–3 times more G3 cases 
than it does in a less-dispersed outbreak (k = 0.5).
Discussion
Using a simple branching process model, we showed that back-
ward contact tracing has the potential to identify a large propor-
tion of infections because of the observed overdispersion in 
COVID-19 transmission. For each index cases detected, forward 
tracing alone can, on average, identify at most the mean number 
of secondary infections (i.e. R). In contrast, backward trac-
ing increases this maximum number of traceable individuals by 
a factor of 2–3, as index cases are more likely to come from clus-
ters than a case is to generate a cluster. Furthermore, backward 
tracing contributes to epidemiological understanding of high-
risk settings because transmission events with a common source 
are more likely to be identified. While standard tracing mostly 
Table 1. Parameter notations and values assumed in simulation.
Parameter Notation Assumed value in Figure 2 
and Extended data, Figures 
S1 and S219
Reproduction number R 1.2, 2.5
Overdispersion parameter k 0.2, 0.5
Relative reduction in transmission due to quarantine c 0.2 – 1.0
Probability of identifying the primary (G0) case by 
backward tracing
b 0.5, 0.8
Probability of identifying each offspring of an already 
identified case
q 0.0– 1.0
Probability of a G1 case identified by surveillance 
independently of contact tracing
d 0.1, 0.2, 0.5
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focuses on forward tracing3,4, there has been increasing interest in a 
possible combination of forward and backward tracing to 
control COVID-1914,20. Our results provide further evidence for 
this approach by quantifying the possible benefit of backward 
tracing, especially when the offspring distribution is highly 
variable, as is the case with SARS-CoV-2.
There are a number of operational challenges to implementing 
such contact tracing approaches. Since the number of contacts 
that lead to transmission is likely to be only a fraction of total 
contacts experienced by detected cases, expanding the coverage 
of contact tracing may involve a substantial logistical burden21,22. 
Engagement with contact tracing systems and adherence to 
quarantine may not necessarily reach sufficient levels23–25. With 
a longer timeline of contact history to be interviewed, recall bias 
may affect the success rate of backward tracing. In practice, inter-
viewed cases might be asked not only for specific individuals 
they know to have contacted but also for a history of locations or 
events visited, as happens during outbreak investigations so 
that those who were present can be notified and/or tested. 
Backward tracing can in effect be viewed as an outbreak inves-
tigation process in which new cases and their contacts can be 
routinely linked via their shared exposure events, supported by 
cross-referencing over epidemiological, diagnostic and quaran-
tine datasets, with additionally identified infections triggering 
further tracing. Due to the difficulty in determining the direction 
of transmission, backward tracing may find a cluster of cases 
rather than a single primary case. However, our results still 
apply as long as subsequent forward tracing is conducted for all 
of the identified cases.
Our model makes some simplifying assumptions. Delays in 
confirmation and tracing were such that only generation-2 (G2) 
cases were assumed to be traced and quarantined before becom-
ing infectious. In reality, cases are identified at different points in 
time and the reduction in infectiousness may be partial if cases 
are quarantined after becoming infectious (which can be a con-
cern for backward tracing with an additional generation to trace). 
To allow intuitive comparison, the effectiveness of tracing was 
measured by the proportion of G3 cases averted given an index 
case detected by surveillance, and long-term dynamics were 
not considered. We believe our focus on assessing the effective-
ness of a single practice of contact tracing triggered by a detected 
case is more relevant to operational-level decision making given 
finite resources. We also did not consider in our model that 
independently detected multiple index cases may have the same 
Table 2. Characteristics of transmissions from a primary case identified by backward contact tracing 





Mean number of 
transmissions from 
primary case (𝔼(x | G0))
Probability 
(x ≥ 5 | G0)
Probability 
(x ≥ 10 | G0)
Probability 
(x ≥ 25 | G0)
0.8
0.1 9.8 67% 39% 7%
0.2 5.8 49% 18% 0.7%
0.3 4.5 38% 9% 0.1%
0.4 3.8 30% 5% 0.02%
0.5 3.4 25% 3% 0.003%
1.2
0.1 14.2 77% 53% 17%
0.2 8.2 62% 32% 4%
0.3 6.2 53% 20% 0.9%
0.4 5.2 45% 13% 0.2%
0.5 4.6 40% 9% 0.07%
2.5
0.1 28.5 88% 74% 43%
0.2 16.0 81% 59% 21%
0.3 11.8 75% 48% 11%
0.4 9.8 71% 40% 6%
0.5 8.5 67% 34% 3%
𝔼(x | G0): the mean number of offspring generated by a primary case identified by backward tracing (G0 case). Note that this is 
larger than the mean number of offspring of a random case.
Probability (x ≥ n | G0): the probability that the number of offspring generated by a G0 case is n or greater.
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Figure 2. The estimated proportion of generation-3 (G3) cases averted by forward and backward contact tracing for different 
parameter values.  Left panels (A, D, G): the effectiveness (the proportion of G3 cases averted) of forward tracing alone; middle panels 
(B, E, H): the effectiveness of a combination of forward and backward tracing; right panels (C, F, I): incremental effectiveness by combining 
backward tracing with forward tracing. Colours represent the relative reduction in transmission from G2 cases if traced and held in quarantine 
(c). R: the reproduction number; k: overdispersion parameter; q: proportion of secondary infections caused by a detected case successfully 
traced; b: probability of successful identification of the primary case; d: probability of detection of generation-2 (G2) cases independent of 
contact tracing.
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Figure 3. The estimated absolute number of generation-3 (G3) cases averted by forward and backward contact tracing. Left 
panels (A, D, G): the number of cases averted by forward tracing alone; middle panels (B, E, H): the number of cases averted by a combination 
of forward and backward tracing; right panels (C, F, I): additional cases averted by combining backward tracing with forward tracing. Colours 
represent the assumed reproduction number R. k: overdispersion parameter; q: proportion of secondary infections caused by a detected 
case successful traced; c: relative reduction in transmission from quarantined cases; b: probability of successful identification of the primary 
case; d: probability of detection of generation-2 (G2) cases independent of contact tracing.
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primary case, which can cause duplicated effort of backward 
tracing. However, such duplication may be minimised if infor-
mation of each index case is shared among health officials; 
moreover, overlapping backward tracing still has a benefit 
because it increases confidence in the identification of primary 
cases or infection settings.
With these limitations, our results suggest a significant poten-
tial benefit to backward tracing, which should be balanced 
against finite resources. Because backward tracing is opera-
tionally a set of forward tracing measures targeting multiple G1 
cases in parallel, additional effectiveness requires a propor-
tional amount of effort, in addition to the ‘overhead’ investiga-
tion effort to identify other G1 cases. Cost-effectiveness analysis 
combined with finer-scale dynamic modelling would help further 




All data underlying the results are available as part of the article 
and no additional source data are required.
Extended data
Zenodo: akira-endo/COVID19_backwardtracing: Implication of 
backward contact tracing in the presence of overdispersed 
transmission in COVID-19 outbreaks. https://doi.org/10.5281/ 
zenodo.406220819.
Supplementary text ‘COVID19_backwardtracing.html’ contains 
the following supplementary figures (files stored in subfolder 
‘figs’), which are also available on GitHub:
•    Figure S1: The estimated effectiveness with R = 2.5.
•    Figure S2: The estimated effectiveness with R = 1.2 and 
d = 0.5.
•    Figure S3: The number of generation 3 cases averted with 
60% success rate of tracing and 60% relative reduction 
in transmission during quarantine.
Software availability
The reproducible code is available from: https://github.com/
akira-endo/COVID19_backwardtracing.
Archived repository at time of publication: https://doi.
org/10.5281/zenodo.406220819.
License: MIT
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distribution; (iii) assess contact tracing effectiveness, measured by generation-3 (G3) cases 
averted. With the observed overdispersion SARS-CoV-2 transmission, the findings suggest 
backward contact tracing can be an effective tool for outbreak control. 
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Abstract 
Results paragraph: It currently reads “a primary case generating 3-10 times more infections than 
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Final sentence: Suggest amending “of overdispersion as was observed” to “of overdispersion as is 
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Para 1, L5-8: The sentence beginning “By identifying…” repeats, in my view, much of the 
information given in the opening sentence and could be removed. 
 
Para 2, L9: Amend “upper bound of incubation period” to “upper bound of the incubation period”. 
 
Para 4, L4: Propose repositioning the phrase “using a simple branching process model” to the first 
line, following “In the present study”. 
 
Methods 
Check the first usage of G2 and G3 and that the acronyms are introduced alongside the full phrase 
(i.e. generation-2 (G2), generation-3 (G3)). 
 
Simulation subsection, Para 2, L5: Replace “generation-3” by G3. 
 
Simulation subsection, Para 4, L3: Add “a” ahead of “proportion (1-d)(1-bq)”. 
 
Simulation subsection, Para 4, Equation for ΔF+B: I think there is a typo with regards to the 




Para 1, L7: In the passage “distribution ranging 0.1-0.5”, to aid flow of text consider replacing with 
“distribution ranging between 0.1-0.5”. 
 
Para 1, L10-13: I believe the percentage range specified for the tail probabilities are specific to the 
number of offspring generated by a primary case being five or higher (rather than 10 or higher, or 
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misinterpretation. 
 
Para 2, L2-5: In the description of findings presented in Figures 2, S1, S2, there is a lack of 
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approaches, additional references may be added to reflect how some of the stated issues have 
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tracing apps (in multiple nations), and the distinction between complex versus non-complex cases 
in NHS test and trace in contacts of test positive individuals being successfully identified and 
reached. 
 
Figures & Tables 
Table 1: As Figure S2 uses d=0.5, should the assumed values for d listed be expanded to “0.1, 0.2, 
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Table 2: I believe there is scope for an accompanying figure to visualise, for a given value of the 
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overdispersion parameter, how the mean number of transmission from a primary case and the 
tail probabilities vary with the reproduction number. 
 
Figure 2 caption title: It may be beneficial to add the study definition of tracing effectiveness into 
the caption title (e.g. “The estimated proportion of generation-3 (G3) cases averted by forward and 
backward contact tracing”). This would match the style used in the Figure 3 caption title. 
 
Figure 2 caption, L4: Add the notation c in the sentence “Colours represent…” The subsequent 
description of c (L5-6) can then be removed. 
 
Figure 2 caption, L5: Replace “successful” with “successfully”. 
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Results 
Para 2, L2-5: In the description of findings presented in Figures 2, S1, S2, there is a lack of 
comment on the relationship with the variable q. 
 
> We agree with the reviewer that q plays an important role as well as other parameters (such as 
c) in the estimated effectiveness of forward and backward tracing. However, in this result 
paragraph we aimed to limit our focus on the role of overdispersion k in backward tracing for 
clarity and conciseness because it is the main scope of this paper. We believe that although we 
did not specifically mention q here, its role is made clear in Figure 2, where q serves as the 
horizontal axis. 
 
Figures & Tables 
Table 2: I believe there is scope for an accompanying figure to visualise, for a given value of 
the overdispersion parameter, how the mean number of transmission from a primary case 
and the tail probabilities vary with the reproduction number. 
 
> We believe that a figure as suggested may be of less relevance to the focus of this paper for the 
following reasons: 
- The figure for the mean number of transmissions from a primary case E(x|G0)=1+R(1+1/k)  with 
a constant k would not be very informative as the relationship is linear. We believe that changing 
k while holding R constant (as we did in Table 2) is preferable to highlight the role of 
overdispersion. 
- The mean number of cases averted shown in Figure 3 is closely related to the mean number of 
transmissions from a primary case and thus an additional figure as suggested could be 
redundant (and we believe Figure 3 is more public health relevant).  
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